D.U.R.C. - What Have They Done?

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[00:00:14] It has a repression.

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[00:00:18] Every range is being moved outside the church.

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[00:00:22] We'll gather inside the church.

[00:00:23] We'll faithful, faithful, faithful. brought this module, this training module to my attention. It's called bio security for vaccine producers module one, dual use equipment of concern. But before we go into that document here, I think we need to go back and define a little bit about what is dual use research, and specifically dual use research of concern.

[00:01:42] So in order to better define that,

[00:01:44] we're going to look at a paper here

[00:01:45] from a place called Newfield Council on Bioethics. is that this dual use concept is and what it encompasses and we'll go a little bit into this paper because it says some very important things that relate directly to the other paper, the primary one that we're going to look at. And that's actually not a paper. It's more of a slideshow presentation, but it's a training seminar for people within the industry. So

[00:03:01] let's just lay the groundwork for what it is we're talking about four frequently cited trends in biology that are complicating this so-called dual-use dilemma. And those are number one. The increasing pace of change in the life science and related fields. Number two. The increasing convergence of biology and biomedicine with mathematics,

[00:04:22] engineering, chemistry, computer science,-U-R-C. The seminal report focusing on the dual use dilemma in the US National Academies of Sciences report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, chaired by MIT biologist Gerald

[00:05:45] Fink. bio-weapon attack. Biotechnology research in an age of terrorism formed a significant part of the political discourse around dual use in the early 2000s that conflated concerns over cutting edge scientific experiments with the Amerithrax case and other types of potential bioterrorist events with little differentiation of the types of factors that might shape each of these distinct

[00:07:03] threats. We're going to get to the important part a new National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to provide guidance for the review and oversight of such experiments and other dual-use research concerns. The National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity was chartered in 2004 by the Executive Office

[00:08:23] of the President to provide advice to the U.S. Government also the availability and use of new technologies to produce advanced bio-weapons threats. The NSABB proposed a split between two kinds of science. Dual-use research was used to refer in general to legitimate life sciences research with

[00:09:41] potential to yield information that could be misused to threaten public health and safety

[00:09:46] and other aspects of national security. Notice that they keep using these seven categories, that number seven, two sevens so far have turned up in this paper back to back at first. They identified seven classes of experiments that would render misuse concerns and now the Think Committee has actually classified seven categories of technologies and knowledge

[00:11:00] that could enable these different consequences here.

[00:11:03] The Think Committee categories were descriptors of information products or technologies that interventions against that agent or toxin or facilitate their ability to evade detection methodologies. 4. Increase the stability, transmissibility, or the ability to disseminate a biological agent or toxin. 5. Alter the host range or tropism of a biological agent or toxin.

[00:12:23] 6. number two, to synthesize pathogens and toxins without cultivation of microorganisms or using other natural sources. Number three, to identify new mechanisms to disrupt the healthy functioning of humans, animals, and plants, and number four, to develop novel means of delivering biological agents

[00:13:40] and toxins.

[00:13:41] Gonna pause there.

[00:13:43] That is exactly, gain of function research folks.

[00:13:47] In a nutshell, isn't it? which could also help optimize the impact of a deliberate release. The creation of a chimera virus from the components of an influenza virus and the liznile virus and the identification and characterization of antibiotic resistance to new antibiotics previously held in reserve for the treatment of multi-drug resistance strains.

[00:15:02] More virulent mousepox in an attempt to virus proved to be highly lethal in infected mice, including those that had been vaccinated against it. After discussion, it was decided to pursue publication of the findings.

[00:16:23] When the paper was published in the Journal used to render the smallpox vaccines ineffective. Synthetic Polio virus. In 2002, researchers demonstrated that it was unlikely that the same approach would be successful in producing a working virus. Critics of the research were also skeptical about the scientific value of the research and the need for its publication, arguing that the techniques used in the experiment were not new and the research did not lead to new knowledge or insights.

[00:19:02] That should give you a little bit of insight into what's going on here. They had no reason endemic, using gene sequences from archived materials and from lung tissue of an influenza victim who had been buried in permafrost in 1918. Using reverse genetics, the researchers generated the relevant 1918 viral coding sequences and outfitted raised concerns about the risks posed by resurrecting the virus, questioned the safety procedures for handling the virus, and even questioned the scientific value of the experiment, arguing that the research had limited utility. Others

[00:21:40] questioned whether the research findings should have been published. The NSABB Influenza viruses, an area of virology which creates pathogens that could potentially cause pandemics first attracted attention in 2011. Two leading influenza laboratories led by Ron Foshe at the Erasmus Medical Center in the Netherlands and Yoshihiro Kooka at the University

[00:23:00] of Wisconsin-Madison revealed that they had made versions in the mainstream circles of things, but make no mistake about it, the intelligence community takes it very seriously. In January 2012, a group of leading influenza virologists agreed to a voluntary moratorium

[00:24:26] on these so-called gain of function research. They had put a temporary moratorium on it, but make no mistake about it. They're still doing it. They've never stopped. See, they're just not talking about it publicly now like they were before. It's still going on and they'll cite things

[00:25:42] like go national security and that kind of thing.

[00:25:45] And they'll keep this stuff compartmentalized Existing natural biological systems and I'm gonna pause right there folks. This is talking about cybernetics cybernetics and transhumanism All together in one here. That's this emerging field of synthetic biology. This is what the plan is It's all part of the transhumanist push

[00:27:01] It's it's all the same. It's all based upon cyber Hoyt's in 2010, a major milestone in the use of DNA synthesis techniques to create more complex and functional products, and pay attention to that word products folks. In 2014, a designer, yeast chromosome, was constructed. This time a

[00:28:21] major advanced towards building a completely synthetic eukaryotic genome. which is enabling deletions and additions in human DNA sequences with greater efficiency, precision, and control than ever before. CRISPR, clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats, has become the major technology employed for these purposes and has been used to manipulate the genes of organisms

[00:29:40] as diverse as yeast, plants, mice, and reported in April 2015, human embryos. of chromosomes is inherited by only half the offspring. But gene drives are now allowing a mutation made by CRISPR on one chromosome to copy itself to its partner in every generation so that nearly all offspring will inherit the change. This means in that a gene can in principle spread through a population

[00:31:00] exponentially faster than normal. The that brings us to our primary focus here, our concern. This is a slideshow presentation called Biosecurity for Vaccine Producers Module 1.

[00:32:20] Dual use equipment of concern. And this is here, we'll look down the slides here, key messages, many types of vaccine production equipment are considered dual use equipment. The only difference between a vaccine and a bioterror agent is the final inactivation step.

[00:33:42] Gonna pause right there.

[00:33:45] The final inactivation step.

[00:33:47] Well, here's the thing. and performance and then it gives you a reflection here. Product production equipment, it says on a piece of paper list all the types of equipment that you can think of being used in your production facility for a production of a vaccine either upstream or downstream and then it gives on the next slide here some typical answers that people in this field would probably give

[00:35:03] a fermenter, a bio reactor, a centrifuge, freeze dryer, purification column, filter that the only difference between a vaccine and a biological weapon is the choice of agent and final inactivation step. And it has a lovely picture of some babies on the left and an old person dying on a gurney surrounded by people in hazmat suits on the right. Isn't that lovely? Biosecurity and vaccine productions!

[00:36:21] There is rising need for vaccine manufacturers to understand easily available. So it says awareness of the risk. The dual use aspect of the production equipment paired with single use equipment availability becomes an even more volatile mixture. Many manufacturers are unaware of the risks associated with dual use equipment, large scale production knowledge and techniques and I'm gonna pause right there and that should be a reason for

[00:37:42] concern shouldn't it? Most of these manufacturers they really have no clue And the following were targeted. First of all, the seed agents or cell lines stored in cryo were stolen. Production equipment sitting in a warehouse was stolen. Production equipment in use were stolen. Bulk product from a stainless steel fermenter were tapped and stolen. Bulk product in a single use system on wheels were rolled out of the production.

[00:39:00] Final product awaiting final release were tampered with.

[00:39:04] And it says write down your answers

[00:39:06] and continue to the list there. Next section here, production equipment,

[00:40:20] typical answers, production equipment,

[00:40:23] sitting in a warehouse was stolen,

[00:40:24] adversaries can acquire export controlled equipment by this way, compromise of the rest of the batch by non-aceptic sampling technique. Non-inactivated product could be used as seed material for other large scale batches somewhere else. Bulk product in a single-use system on wheels was rolled out of the production. Final product for market would not be available causing potential stop and vaccination campaigns, loss of revenue

[00:41:42] and credibility. Non-inactivated product could be the source associated with the outbreak or the attack. Number two, it can have dire business consequences for the future of the facility. Number three, outbreaks and pandemics can be envisioned as a plausible outcome and history

[00:43:03] has shown that this type of bioterrorism has happened in the past. Do you still feel safe taking these products, folks? Like, I don't know what else to tell people. Let's read down here. Certified vaccine authorities do not see it as their mandate to enforce biosafety and security procedures as these entities primarily focus on protecting the product and the end

[00:44:20] user and not to the same degree protecting to any of these biological agents, folks. Did you hear that? Let's continue on. Here's the next sentence. That leaves the National Environmental Regulation as the only driver to introduce a comprehensive biosafety engagement strategy for preventing release, unless vaccine companies respond to

[00:45:40] the threat and take their own actions to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in an armed conflict. In a pause there, do you see how they leave the door wide open for state actors to actually maybe for the purposes of say peaceful

[00:47:01] research testing it upon their own populations instead of other countries or or using it as a

[00:48:05] It focuses on acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring, or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

[00:48:08] And it says furthermore, there are implementation documents such as Council Regulation No.

[00:48:14] 428, 2009, and May 2009 that focuses on how to set up a community regime for the control

[00:48:21] of exports, transfer, brokering, and transit of are of biggest concern as they relate to the very specialized skill set required to propagate small volumes of material into very large volumes. As long as a real biosecurity law is not implemented and enforced in a country, it is difficult to envision that the vaccine producers will, on their own, change their priorities and

[00:49:43] behaviors overnight. equipment are considered dual use equipment. Number two, the only difference between a vaccine and a bioterror agent is the final inactivation step. Remember that one folks, the only difference between a vaccine and a bioterror agent is the final released product for sale seed lots and seed strains so okay let's let's take all that information in for a second folks vaccine producers they already protect

[00:52:20] this information okay so that means you can't get a straight answer from them obliged to tell you about because of that and that kind of violates the whole idea of informed consent doesn't it? Let's read down at the statement down at the bottom here It would only take a little extra effort to protect the access to intermediate immediate non inactivated products production materials and equipment with dual use potential and then it goes on to

[00:53:42] List action plan so it leaves this open okay because it leaves some questions

[00:54:43] to put any of these security measures in place to protect their production.

[00:54:45] It's just ridiculous.

[00:54:48] You could look at this and then realize

[00:54:51] that one of the important takeaways from this

[00:54:54] is the way that it talks about the major difference

[00:54:58] between what would be considered a vaccine

[00:55:00] and a bioterror agent.

[00:55:02] And that would be the inactivation phase.

[00:55:05] Now, when you look at some what you do out there. We've got the the public so brainwashed into going along with this whole kind of agenda here, this whole play. They're just lining up and getting these

[00:56:24] shots because well, you know, you listen to some is all these things were already put through their pastes 30 years ago within the auspices of the military industrial complex. They've weaponized and found every use for these things 30 years ago with these technologies. They're far older than what they tell us. They've run them

[00:57:42] through their paces in these black budget programs and these special access You're something to say We're gonna hungry mine There is lots for us to find A thousand steps to take today

[01:00:22] The sun's born awake